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Abstract
The complexity resulting from intertwined uncertainties regarding model misspeciﬁcation
and mismeasurement of the state of the economy deﬁnes the monetary policy landscape.
Using the euro area as laboratory this paper explores the design of robust policy guides
aiming to maintain stability in the economy while recognizing this complexity. We document
substantial output gap mismeasurement and make use of a new model data base to capture
the evolution of model speciﬁcation. A simple interest rate rule is employed to interpret
ECB policy since 1999. An evaluation of alternative policy rules across 11 models of the
euro area conﬁrms the fragility of policy analysis optimized for any speciﬁc model and shows
the merits of model averaging in policy design. Interestingly, a simple diﬀerence rule with
the same coeﬃcients on inﬂation and output growth as the one used to interpret ECB policy
is quite robust as long as it responds to current outcomes of these variables.
Keywords: Financial crisis, complexity, monetary policy, model uncertainty, robust simple
rules, ECB.
JEL Classiﬁcation: E50, E52, E58.
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In the aftermath of every major crisis, collective introspection among central bankers and
economists invariably leads to the acknowledgement that the complexity of the economy is
far greater than fathomed before. The ability to measure and diagnose incipient problems
and avert trouble may seem diminished. The understanding of the workings of the economy
may seem worse than appreciated earlier. The eﬀectiveness of policy tools to tackle an
initial shock and maintain stability may seem less certain.
The intensity of the resulting sense of misapprehension, however, varies with the con 
ﬁdence one had in our ability to measure, understand and control the economy. To those
who fundamentally believe that the macroeconomy is too complex to measure and control
very eﬀectively to begin with, a crisis merely conﬁrms our imperfect understanding of its
functioning. In this sense, the present crisis, like every major crisis in the past, has served
to reaﬃrm the limits of our knowledge and temper optimism that central banks can sta 
bilize the economy with great precision. In this light, the crisis has reaﬃrmed that our
eﬀorts should be focused on improving robustness in policy design, acknowledging that our
measurement may be imperfect and our models misspeciﬁed.1
In this paper we explore the design of robust policy guides aiming to maintain stability
in the economy while recognizing the potential misspeciﬁcation in modelling and mismea 
surement of the state of the economy.We focus our analysis on the euro area and explore
how a simple interest rate rule can help interpret ECB policy over the past dozen years.
We then compare the performance of 11 models of the euro area under alternative policy
rules, exploring implications and limits of robustness analysis.
The paper is organized in 10 sections. Section 2 reviews some of the sources of complexity
in the economy and in policy design. Section 3 looks at the stability oriented approach
of the ECB in this light. Section 4 examines the evolution of macroeconomic models of
the euro area and resulting changes in perceptions of macroeconomic dynamics over the
1See McCallum (1988), Taylor (1993b) and the contributions in the volume edited by Bryant, Hooper, and
Mann (1993) for early discussions on robust policy rules. Taylor and Williams (2010) provide a comprehensive
recent survey.
1past decade. Section 5 introduces a generalized policy rule for evaluation in the euro area
models. Diﬀerences between the models are illustrated by means of impulse response and
autocorrelation functions in section 6. Section 7 presents optimized model speciﬁc rules.
Sections 8 and 9 set up and perform the robustness analysis. Section 10 concludes.
2 Complexity: Intertwined Uncertainties
For this study, we consider that the objective of monetary policy is to maintain price stability
and economic stability.2 That is, the central bank is given the task of maintaining a low
and stable rate of inﬂation, consistent with the central bank’s deﬁnition of price stability
and of avoiding major macroeconomic ﬂuctuations.
A broad consensus has evolved over the past decades on a number of areas regarding
monetary policy strategy. First, the central bank should have a clear numerical deﬁnition
of price stability, for example a rate of inﬂation equal to a ﬁxed low number, π∗. This
can serve as the central bank’s primary objective or target. Second, and in contrast to
the above, in light of the unknown and evolving potential of the economy, no similarly
ﬁxed target for real economic activity should be adopted. Thus, although we can deﬁne
conceptually q∗ to be the economy’s potential output, consistent with price stability, no
precise numerical value would be sensible to adopt over time as a target. Third policy
must be clearly communicated and be systematic in nature, based on a well understood
contingency plan that avoids unnecessary discretion and unpredictability. Fourth, policy
design must be forward looking, in the sense that it needs to account for changes in the
economy resulting from market participants behavior and expectations formation, or for
anticipated shocks and other developments that could be foreseen. Fifth, policy must ensure
that inﬂation expectations over the medium and longer term remain well anchored in line
with the central bank’s deﬁnition of price stability.
Intertwined uncertainties in a number of areas create diﬃculties in arriving at a more
precise description of policy strategy. Consider, for example, the question of how we judge
2For the purposes of our discussion, we largely abstract from the third notion of stability that matters
to central banks—ﬁnancial stability.
2“ideal” performance for the macroeconomy. Since aggregating over individual preferences in
any economy is impossible except under very unrealistic modeling assumptions, irreducible
uncertainty prevails over the precise aggregate performance criterion. We can consider that
good performance should keep inﬂation close to its target—that is the inﬂation gap, π−π∗,
close to zero, and similarly keep the output gap, y ≡ q − q∗, close to zero. But in light of
the measurement diﬃculties associated with providing a precise numerical deﬁnition of full
employment and potential output in real time, deﬁning “ideal” performance is necessarily
elusive.
Consider next the uncertainties regarding the structure of the economy. What are the
key frictions at any point in time and what are their dynamic interactions over time?
The need for simplicity in building models and the need for parsimony in estimating their
empirical properties with our limited data, forces modellers to focus on only a few key
frictions at a time. Some frictions will be missing from each model. To accommodate labor
frictions with greater realism, for example, one may need to abstract from credit frictions,
ﬁnancial market frictions, or ﬁnancial intermediation altogether. And conversely, to model
eﬀectively the intricacies of ﬁnancial intermediation with a rich ﬁnancial sector, one may
abstract from numerous frictions in the real economy sector of a model.
Similarly, uncertainty regarding the determinants of inﬂation in the short run (the
Phillips curve), the formation and evolution over time of inﬂation expectations are all areas
where our knowledge is necessarily limited. Any simple macroeconomic model, however
“sophisticated” or “modern” will be, at best, incomplete. Alternative competing models
will have relative strengths and weaknesses but a suite of models may be best suited to
address a range of potential questions in greater detail.
A crisis, like the present one, may also highlight speciﬁc blind spots that could not
be eﬀectively dealt with because of lack of similar experiences and data conﬁgurations
in the recent past that are needed for estimation and calibration. Consider, for example,
the uncertainty regarding the monetary policy transmission mechanism. Even under normal
conditions this uncertainty is recognized to be considerable. The crisis brought us to an even
3more complex situation as the policy transmission had to be evaluated in an environment of
policy rates approaching the zero lower bound. In most advanced economies, a similar data
conﬁguration had not been observed in decades, at least, except for the Japanese economy
in the late 1990s. For an early exposition of the role of longer term interest rates, exchange
rates and quantitative easing at the zero bound in Japan, we refer the reader to Orphanides
and Wieland (2000). Even so, quantitative evaluation of the channels of transmission and
relative eﬀectiveness of alternative unconventional policies were hard to come by when some
decisions about these policies had to be taken.
As a result of the complexity resulting from these intertwined uncertainties, the exact
form of the systematic policy rule that a central bank should pursue, or the degree to
which its orientation should be forward looking or the intensity with which it should aim
to stabilize inﬂation over the near term, and so on, cannot be determined with precision.
This is one way to interpret the quest for robustness, searching for fairly simple rules
that can be evaluated over a great number of competing models, aiming to identify policy
guides that can achieve reasonably good performance overall.
3 Monetary Policy in the Euro Area
The considerations regarding the pursuit of robustness highlighted in the preceding section
are helpful for understanding some of the drivers of monetary policy in the euro area.
First, the monetary policy of the ECB emphasizes the importance of maintaining well 
anchored inﬂation expectations, in line with its numerical deﬁnition of price stability. Figure
1 compares the evolution of inﬂation in the euro area to survey results on inﬂation expec 
tations ﬁve years ahead from the ECB’s Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF). As can
be seen, despite the volatility of actual inﬂation, the mean forecast is extremely stable and
the majority of respondents in each quarter expect that the ECB will achieve inﬂation in
line with its objective of close to but below 2 percent over the medium term.
Second, the ECB’s stability oriented approach does not put great emphasis on output
gap estimates when policy decisions are made. One reason for this is the extreme unreli 
4ability of real time estimates of the output gap for the euro area.3 Figure 2 provides an
example of how misleading the information embedded in real time estimates of the out 
put gap can be in real time. The ﬁgure traces the evolution of the output gap estimates
produced by the European Commission (EC) for the two years prior to the present crisis.
With the beneﬁt of hindsight, one can consider whether use of the estimate for the gap for
2006 would have helped guide monetary policy in the right direction. As can be seen, the
opposite is the case, reliance on the gap would have hindered policy. Looked at from the
latest perspective (the Autumn 2011 estimate), the output gap was signiﬁcantly positive
in 2006, suggesting the euro area economy was, if anything, overheated before the crisis.
But according to the European Commission in 2006 the economy was operating below its
potential. Had policymakers relied on this information, they would have loosened policy,
a serious mistake in light of the information now available. The same story applies to the
estimates for the year 2007, when the turbulence in ﬁnancial markets started.
By contrast, euro area monetary aggregates had already indicated a sustained upward
shift in trend money growth – a potential indication of overheating – for some years. Such
signals are regularly analyzed as part of the monetary pillar in the ECB’s strategy. ECB
President Trichet has credited the monetary pillar in particular for the ECB’s decision to
start raising policy rates in December 2005 (see Trichet (2008)).
The unreliability of measuring the output gap is not conﬁned to these years but is more
general in nature. One illustration is provided in Figure 3 that compares the EC real time
estimates of the output gap for each year available with the most recent estimates. As can
be seen, the errors are substantial and very persistent. In this small sample, a signiﬁcant
bias is also evident, resulting from the fact that, over the past decade, experts have generally
become more pessimistic about growth prospects in the euro area, marking down estimates
of potential output growth. The revisions in the growth rates of potential have been small—
just a few tenths of a percentage point—but they accumulate into noticeable diﬀerences on
the level of the output gap.
3See, for example, European Central Bank (November 2011).
5A simple policy rule that determines the change in the policy rate in response to inﬂation
and the diﬀerence of the output gap reduces the impact of such measurement problems:
 i =
1
2
(π − π∗) +
1
2
( q −  q∗). (1)
Interestingly, such a rule can also be used to illustrate the systematic and forward looking
nature of ECB policy over the past dozen years. It may be noted that the diﬀerence of
growth from potential output growth,  q − q∗ is approximately equal to the diﬀerence in
the output gap,  y, over the pertinent horizon. For this illustration, the EC’s approximate
real time estimates of potential output growth are employed for  q∗. Further, two numerical
guides for π∗ are used, a lower guide of 1.5 and an upper guide of 2. For the inﬂation and
real output growth forecasts, the near term forecasts from the ECB’s SPF are employed.
Figures 4 and 5 present the one  and two year forecasts of inﬂation and real GDP growth
that could be used as inputs guiding a forecast based policy.4
Figures 6 and 7 show the policy prescriptions derived from using the one year ahead
forecasts as inputs to the simple rule. The shaded area is the envelope of the two rules
corresponding to the two alternative guides for π∗. As can be seen, despite its simplicity,
the illustration based on inputs from the EC and private forecasters indicates that the
contours of the resulting simple rule prescriptions are similar to the evolution of actual
ECB policy over this period.5 The most signiﬁcant deviations can be observed during 2009
and 2010, a period when changes in unconventional measures complemented conventional
policy in a manner not reﬂected in the basic policy rate (the MRO) that is shown in the
ﬁgures. Figure 8 shows the eﬀects of these unconventional measures on money market rates.
As noted earlier, the ECB’s strategy also involves a special role for monetary aggregates
in making interest rate decisions. A formal approach for including ECB style cross checking
of near term inﬂation and output forecasts with longer term monetary trends in simple
4The horizon is measured from the last available datapoint when the survey is taken. For example, the
survey reported in Q1 is taken in late January when GDP data are available for Q3 of the prior year. The
“one-year” forecast refers to GDP growth from Q3 of the previous year to Q3 of the current year which is
only 2 quarters away from the date of the survey. For inﬂation, the “one-year” forecast refers to a horizon
about 3 quarters away from the date of the survey.
5Estimated versions of this rule, as reported in Smets (2008), conﬁrm that best-ﬁtting parameterizations
are broadly similar.
6interest rules such as equation (1) has been proposed in Beck and Wieland (2007) and Beck
and Wieland (2008) but is not exploited here.
4 Complexity: Changing perceptions/models of euro area
macroeconomic dynamics
Researchers at central banks and other institutions use structural macroeconomic models
to understand the interaction of monetary policy and macroeconomic ﬂuctuations. The
uncertainty about the transmission of monetary policy to aggregate output and inﬂation
is reﬂected in the uncertainty about the appropriate model of the economy. Changing
perceptions regarding the impact of policy decisions on the economy in turn are reﬂected
in changing modeling structures and parameter estimates. We capture this development in
policy modeling by considering 11 models of euro area macroeconomic dynamics that were
built and estimated over the years by researchers at the ECB and other central banks as well
as at universities, the International Monetary Fund and the European Commission.6 The 11
models are listed in Table 1. They have been made available in the context of a large scale
model comparison project. An exposition of this new approach to comparative modeling
is available in Wieland, Cwik, M¨ uller, Schmidt, and Wolters (2012) (see also Taylor and
Wieland (2012) and Wieland (2012)).
Each of these models exhibits long run monetary neutrality as well as short run nominal
inertia. As a result, monetary policy has short run real eﬀects and the central bank has
the ability to stabilize output and inﬂation ﬂuctuations. The models diﬀer in many other
dimensions, for example in the degree of forward looking expectation formation, the extent
of optimizing behavior by economic agents, and in terms of magnitude, scope and parameter
estimates. Some of the models are fairly small and focus primarily on the interactions of
output, inﬂation and interest rates. Several models are of medium size and some are rather
large and comprise between two to seven economies. Some models provide more detailed
information on the structure of certain sectors of the economy such as the government,
6A complementary strategy could also examine the evolution of alternative vintages of each model, see
e.g. Tetlow (2009).
7labor markets or the ﬁnancial sector. Some of the models are estimated using harmonized
data from the years prior to the start of European Monetary Union while others which were
built and estimated at a later date also cover part of the EMU period.
Table 1: 11 Estimated Models of the Euro Area
# Name Description
Traditional Keynesian style models
1. EA AWM05 ECB’s (old) area wide model of Dieppe et al (2005)
New Keynesian models with nominal rigidities and rational expectations (NK1)
2. G7 TAY93 G7 model of Taylor (1993a)
3. EA CW05fm Coenen and Wieland (2005), (Fuhrer Moore staggered contracts)
4. EA CW05ta Coenen and Wieland (2005), (Taylor staggered contracts)
5. G3 CW03 G3 model of Coenen and Wieland (2003)
Pre Crisis New Keynesian DSGE models (NK DSGE)
6. EA SW03 Smets and Wouters (2003)
7. EACZ GEM03 Laxton and Pesenti (2003), euro area and Czech republic
8. EA SR07 Sveriges Riksbank euro area model of Adolfson et al (2007)
9. EA QUEST09 EU Commission’s QUEST III model of Ratto et al (2009)
New Keynesian DSGE models built during the crisis
10. EA CKL09 Christoﬀel et al (2009), model with labor market frictions
11. EA GNSS10 Gerali et al (2010) model with ﬁnancial frictions and banking
The 11 models are not ordered by the date of publication but rather by the ”age” of
the underlying theoretical structure.
First, given that some recent commentators have questioned the usefulness of macroeco 
nomic modeling in the last three decades in general7 and state of the art Dynamic Stochastic
General Equilibrium (DSGE) modeling in particular, it seems helpful to start with a tradi 
tional Keynesian style model. This criteria is fulﬁlled by the European Central Bank’s ”old”
Area Wide model linearized as in Dieppe, Kuester, and McAdam (2005), (EA AWM05).
Expectation formation in this model is largely backward looking. It has been used for many
years in the context of the ECB’s forecasting process.8
7See, for example, comments by Willem Buiter in his FT Blog in March 2009 and Paul Krugman in the
Economist weekly in June 2010.
8More recently it has been replaced with a New-Area-Wide-Model (NAWM) of the New Keynesian DSGE
variety (see Christoﬀel, Coenen, and Warne (2008)).
8The other models can be classiﬁed as New Keynesian models because they assume ra 
tional expectations, imperfect competition and wage or price rigidities. Many of these
New Keynesian models fully incorporate recent advances in terms of microeconomic foun 
dations. Such models are often referred to as monetary business cycle models or monetary
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models.
Models 2 to 5 in Table 1 can be grouped into the ﬁrst wave of New Keynesian mod 
eling. In the following we use NK1 to label this group. The G7 model of Taylor (1993a)
is a fairly large scale example of this type of model. It includes staggered wage contracts,
partial adjustment of prices and a detailed decomposition of the demand side in durable,
non durable and services consumption, ﬁxed , equipment  and inventory investment, gov 
ernment purchases, exports and imports. The model equations exhibit many similarities to
current generation New Keynesian DSGE models, but they are not derived as stringently
from the optimization problems of representative households and ﬁrms. We ﬁx the exchange
rates between Germany, France and Italy and simulate them as a euro zone bloc. Output is
assumed to return to a long run potential that is exogenous to monetary policy and govern 
ment spending. The two models of Coenen and Wieland (2005) are much less disaggregated
and focus on aggregate demand, inﬂation and interest rates. The EA CW05ta variant uses
Taylor style staggered wage contracting (Taylor (1980)) and exhibits less nominal rigid 
ity than the EA CW05fm variant with Fuhrer Moore style contracts (Fuhrer and Moore
(1995)). The model of Coenen and Wieland (2003), (G3 CW03), is a three country version
covering the United States, the euro area and Japan and was previously used to evaluate
monetary policy making at the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates in Japan.
Models 6 to 9 in Table 1 are modern New Keynesian DSGE models that were built and
available for use in policy analysis at central banks and international institutions prior to
the global ﬁnancial crisis. In the following, we use the term NK DSGE as a label referring
to this group. The Smets and Wouters (2003) model that was developed at the European
Central bank, (EA SW03), is representative of current thinking in macroeconomics. It is
very similar to, and ’largely based on’ according to Smets and Wouters, the well known
9empirically estimated New Keynesian DSGE model developed by Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Evans (2005). The Smets and Wouters study received much attention in the literature
because it showed that the current generation of DSGE models with sticky prices and wages
was able to capture the time series properties of the data as long as a suﬃcient number of
structural frictions and shocks was considered.
We include, model 7 from Laxton and Pesenti (2003) in the analysis, because it is
a two economy model that accounts for an endogenous response of exports and imports.
The Laxton and Pesenti (2003) model,(EACZ GEM03), was created at the International
Monetary Fund at about the same time as the Smets Wouters model. Model parameters
were not estimated with macroeconomic data but calibrated to values considered reasonable
in light of other studies. Certain parameters and shock variances were matched to euro area
and Czech macroeconomic volatility.
In addition, we have included two fairly large scale estimated DSGE models of the
euro area developed at the Sveriges Riksbank (Adolfson, Laseen, Linde, and Villani (2007),
EA SR07) and the European Commission (Ratto, Roeger, and in ’t Veld (2009), EA QUEST09).
The open economy model of the euro area by Ratto et al. (2009) is estimated with quarterly
euro area data from 1981Q1 to 2006Q1 thereby including a signiﬁcant part of EMU history.
They named their model ’QUEST III’. It was built speciﬁcally for the joint analysis of ﬁscal
and monetary policy and provides a thorough treatment of the government sector. Another
important departure from the assumptions made by Smets and Wouters (2003) and Laxton
and Pesenti (2003) concerns the inclusion of a share of rule of thumb households.
Finally, we also consider two models that have been built since the start of the ﬁnancial
crisis. The model of Christoﬀel, Kuester, and Linzert (2009), EA CKL09, incorporates
unemployment and search frictions in labor market dynamics. Though the model was
revised in 2008, the data used in estimation only extends to the end of 2006. In this
respect, it is still a pre crisis model. More importantly, the model of Gerali, Neri, Sessa,
and Signoretti (2010), (EA GNSS10) covers recent advances in the modeling of the ﬁnancial
sector in response to criticism regarding the lack of such detail in pre crisis DSGE models.
10With regard to credit supply, they add a stylized banking sector to a model with credit
frictions and borrowing constraints as in Iacoviello (2005). Banks have market power in
loan and deposit markets and set diﬀerent rates for households and ﬁrms. Furthermore,
banks face costs in adjusting retail rates and changes in central bank rates are only passed
through to loan and deposit rates over time. Banks accumulate capital out of retained
earnings and aim to keep the ratio to assets close to a target. Their capital position aﬀects
lending and introduces feedback between the real and ﬁnancial sector.
In sum, these 11 models capture the progression in scientiﬁc advances and the practice
of macroeconomic modeling at central banks over the last twenty years very well. In this
manner, they capture changing perceptions of the macroeconomic structure and monetary
policy transmission in the euro area.
5 A class of policy rules
Next, we consider a general monetary policy rule that we want to include in all eleven
models for the purpose of a comparative analysis.
it = ρit−1 + α(pt+h − pt+h−4) + βyt+h + ˜ β(yt+h − yt+h−4) (2)
i refers to the short term nominal interest rate. The rule incorporates interest rate
smoothing with a smoothing parameter ρ. p denotes the (log of) the price level. Thus,
the rule implies a response to the inﬂation rate over four quarters, πt+h = pt+h − pt+h−4,
with the response coeﬃcient α. The inﬂation target π∗ shown previously in equation (1)
is normalized at a value of zero for our model simulations. y is the deviation of output
from the level that would be realized with ﬂexible prices. β measures the magnitude of the
response to the level of the gap and ˜ β to the growth rate over four quarters. h denotes the
relevant horizon. We consider rules based on current outcomes, two quarter ahead forecasts
and four quarter head forecasts, i.e. h ∈ {0,2,4}.
In comparing the choice of forecast horizon in model simulations of this rule to the
11forecast horizon of the rule used in the empirical analysis in section 3, it is important to
keep in mind that the most recent GDP data available in policy practice dates from one
or two quarters prior to the policy decisions. To a large extent, the tremendous eﬀorts
undertaken at central banks in analyzing recent data and producing forecasts concern the
”now casting” for the current and following quarter. For this reason, the four quarter ahead
forecast in the empirical analysis of section 3 is actually closer to a rule with a two quarter 
ahead forecast in the model simulations.
We will explore how simpler rules perform relative to this generalized ﬁve parameter
rule, (ρ,α,β, ˜ β,h). For example, the well known Taylor rule only contains a response to
current inﬂation and the output gap with the following parameter values: (ρ = 0,α =
1.5,β = 0.5, ˜ β = 0,h = 0). Outcome  and forecast based Taylor style rules with interest 
rate smoothing instead imply the following parameter restrictions: (ρ,α,β, ˜ β = 0,h).
Another simpliﬁcation that we evaluate is a response to output growth instead of the
output gap, i.e. (ρ,α,β = 0, ˜ β,h).9 If the coeﬃcient on the lagged interest rate is restricted
to unity, (ρ = 1), these rules are often referred to as ﬁrst diﬀerence rules. The policy rule
in equation (1) that was used to review euro area policy decisions in section 3 is such a
diﬀerence rule with (ρ = 1,α = 0.5,β = 0, ˜ β = 0.5). It can be used with current values of
output and inﬂation and with forecasts. In the subsequent simulation we will use the label
DIF0 to refer to the outcome based version of this diﬀerence rule.
6 Diﬀerences in model dynamics
The sources of euro area macroeconomic ﬂuctuations and the transmission of central bank
policy to euro area aggregates can only be understood through the lens of a macroeconomic
model. Each model provides a diﬀerent perspective and emphasizes diﬀerent elements of
the macroeconomic structure.
9A related question that is often discussed in the literature concerns the deﬁnition of potential output
growth. The above rules use the concept of ﬂexible-price output. An alternative measure that is traditionally
used in policy circles is the deviation from long-run trend output. We denote trend (or steady-state growth)
output in our models by ¯ y. On this basis we can also evaluate trend-growth rules that substitute the growth
rate of the ﬂex-price output gap with the growth rate of the trend gap.
12To illustrate diﬀerences and similarities between models we compute two types of objects:
(i) the impulse response functions of output and inﬂation to a monetary policy shock and
(ii) the autocorrelation functions of output and inﬂation given the stochastic properties of
all other shocks, excluding the monetary policy shock.
We introduce the identical monetary policy rule in all models. Thus, any diﬀerences that
are revealed by our comparison are due to diﬀerences in the non policy part of the macroe 
conomic structure. For this purpose we use a Taylor style rule with interest rate smoothing
that was estimated empirically by Gerdesmeier and Roﬃa (2004) and also employed as
a benchmark in Kuester and Wieland (2010). The GR rule is a restricted version of the
generalized rule in equation (1) with only the lagged interest rate, current inﬂation and the
output gap. The response coeﬃcients are (ρ = 0.66,α = 0.66,β = 0.1, ˜ β = 0,h = 0).10
Figure 9 reports the impact of a 100 basis points increase in the nominal interest rate
on euro area real GDP and inﬂation in the 11 models when interest rates in subsequent
periods are set according to the GR rule. Thus, diﬀerences in the transmission of monetary
policy to output and inﬂation are solely due to diﬀerences in the structural assumptions and
parameter estimates of these models. All models have Keynesian features. Due to nominal
rigidities the increase in the nominal interest rate raises real interest rates and lowers real
output. Inﬂation typically reacts more slowly and declines in response to slowing output
consistent with a Phillips curve. There are substantial diﬀerences in terms of magnitude
and persistence of the eﬀect of such a monetary policy shock. They arise because of diﬀerent
structural assumptions and diﬀerent data used in estimation. Some models use more data
series than others and the sample periods vary.
Figure 10 reports the autocorrelation functions of output and inﬂation in the 11 models
given the variance covariance matrix of the respective model’s structural disturbances but
excluding monetary policy surprises. Both output and inﬂation exhibit persistence in all
models. The degree of persistence, however, varies substantially.
10Alternatively, we could have used the ﬁrst-diﬀerence rule discussed in Section 3 to compute impulse
response and autocorrelation functions. However, we could only have shown results for 10 of the 11 models
because ﬁrst-diﬀerence rules imply explosive behavior in the EA AWM05 model. This feature of the model
is well understood and discussed further in the next section.
13These ﬁndings conﬁrm that the 11 models considered have fairly diﬀerent implications
for euro area macroeconomic dynamics and monetary policy transmission. Given many of
these models have been built and used at policy institutions they represent a policy relevant
range of model uncertainty.
7 Model-speciﬁc rules
How well would the generalized rule deﬁned by equation (2) perform in stabilizing output
and inﬂation dynamics in the diﬀerent models of the euro area? To answer this question
we search for the values of the parameters of the rule that are most eﬀective in a given
model. To evaluate policy performance we use the weighted sum of unconditional variances
of inﬂation deviations from target (normalized at zero), the output gap, and the quarterly
change in the interest rate.
  Lm = V ar(π) + V ar(y) + V ar( i) (3)
This loss function is of practical relevance as it captures the two objectives outlined in section
2, that is maintaining a low and stable rate of inﬂation and avoiding major macroeconomic
ﬂuctuations. In addition, it includes moderating the volatility of policy rates as a third
objective. This term captures central banks’ tendency to smooth interest rates and avoid
frequent policy reversals of great magnitude.
We then choose the response coeﬃcients (ρ,α,β, ˜ β) and the horizon h to minimize the
above loss function. In doing so we consider three diﬀerent horizons, h ∈ {0,2,4}. ρ is
restricted to lie between 0 and 1.5 and the other coeﬃcients between  3 and 3. These
boundaries only matter in one model. The coeﬃcient values and horizons that deliver the
minimum loss in each model are reported in Table 2 together with the resulting absolute
loss.
Optimized model speciﬁc rules almost always involve the lagged interest rate, inﬂation,
the output gap and output growth. One model has a coeﬃcient of zero on output growth,
(G3 CW03), and another one a near zero coeﬃcient on the output gap, (EA SR07). The
14Table 2: Model Speciﬁc Rules vs Taylor, GR and First Diﬀerence Rules
# Name ρ α β ˜ β h Min(L) L(Tay) L(GR) L(Dif,h=0)
1. EA AWM05 0.83 0.49 1.19 0.21 4 3.05 5.8 7.9 ∞
2. G7 TAY93 1.16 0.51 1.85  0.09 2 11.69 19.5 19.4 17.5
3. EA CW05fm 0.85 0.52 0.58 0.07 0 5.71 10.3 9.5 8.8
4. EA CW05ta 0.86 0.14 0.90  0.24 2 2.63 4.7 4.8 3.8
5. G3 CW03 0.87 0.13 0.55 0.00 0 1.95 3.5 3.3 2.6
6. EA SW03 0.98 0.10 1.09  0.28 0 1.46 4.9 5.1 2.6
7. EACZ GEM03 0.98 2.02 0.25 1.50 4 1.26 1.6 3.3 1.6
8. EA SR07 1.03 0.11  0.03 0.79 0 5.77 19.4 16.0 8.3
9. EA QUEST09 1.05 0.75 0.15 0.42 0 3.03 18.0 8.0 3.2
10. EA CKL09 1.50 3.00  0.39  0.51 4 4.36 8.8 5.8 6.2
11. EA GNSS10 1.21 0.76 0.55  0.18 0 13.7 ∞ 23.1 21.0
EA CKL09 model exhibits very extreme coeﬃcients which represent a corner solution at
the pre set boundaries of 1.5 for the coeﬃcient on the lagged interest rate and 3 for the
coeﬃcient on inﬂation.
Six of the models prefer a policy response to current outcomes of inﬂation, the output
gap and output growth over forecasts of these variables. In 3 models, the optimal forecast
horizon is four quarters and in two models the best performance is achieved with two quarter
ahead forecasts.
The response coeﬃcients on inﬂation, the output gap and output growth vary substan 
tially across models. The minimum losses achieved under the model speciﬁc rules are quite
a bit lower than under Taylor’s rule, the GR rule or the outcome based version of the ﬁrst 
diﬀerence rule from equation (1), DIF0. DIF0 implies explosive dynamics in the ECB’s
Area Wide model as indicated by the ∞ sign in Table 1. As noted in Kuester and Wieland
(2010) this model does not tolerate a unit root in the nominal policy rate because it exhibits
largely backward looking dynamics and assigns almost no role to forward looking, rational
expectations. Taylor’s rule typically implies greater losses than the GR or DIF0 rules
because it restricts the coeﬃcient on the lagged interest rate to zero. Models with ratio 
15nal expectations typically attribute substantial improvements in stabilization performance
to interest rate smoothing (Levin, Wieland, and Williams (1999)). Somewhat surprisingly,
however, the Taylor rule implies equilibrium indeterminacy in the EA GNSS10 model with
ﬁnancial frictions and banking. This outcome is also signaled by an ∞ sign in the table.
8 Robustness
Unfortunately, model speciﬁc rules that are optimized for one model are typically not ro 
bust to model uncertainty. They often deliver much worse or even disastrous performance
in other models. To the extent another model provides a better match for the unknown
structure of the euro area economy than the policy maker’s preferred framework, the policy
recommendations resulting from the model speciﬁc rule favored by this policy maker would
induce much greater macroeconomic ﬂuctuations than anticipated. Table 3 illustrates this
model risk by reporting outcomes for each of the 11 model speciﬁc rules from Table 1 in
the other 10 models. The values shown are percentage increases in the loss function under
each rule relative to the rule optimal in the speciﬁc model. Thus, values on the diagonal are
equal to zero by deﬁnition. Oﬀ diagonal we observe many cases with explosive dynamics
or equilibrium indeterminacy as indicated by ∞. Furthermore, there are many cases where
losses more than double or triple relative to the model speciﬁc rule. Thus, it would be of
great beneﬁt to know exactly which model constitutes the best possible representation of
the macroeconomic structure of the euro area economy. In the absence of this knowledge,
policymakers are best advised not to use purely model speciﬁc policy recommendations as
guidance in making policy decisions.
An alternative approach that promises more robust performance across models is Bayesian
model averaging ( Levin, Wieland, and Williams (2003), Brock, Durlauf, and West (2007)
and Kuester and Wieland (2010)). We start by considering a Bayesian policy with ﬂat
priors that assigns equal probabilities or weights to each model. Thus, we pick the response
16Table 3: Lack of Robustness of Model Speciﬁc Rules
# Rule 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.
1. EA AWM05 0 30 48 61 58 16 113 228 113 74 126
2. G7 TAY93 232 0 31 32 26 5 216 285 229 35 107
3. EA CW05fm 107 11 0 11 10 24 81 171 93 28 47
4. EA CW05ta 38 10 235 0 1 21 5032 ∞ ∞ 54 ∞
5. G3 CW03 92 5 105 ∞ 0 18 2624 ∞ ∞ 29 ∞
6. EA SW03 775 8 153 35 26 0 1539 ∞ 1624 29 ∞
7. EACZ GEM03 183 159 25 49 54 321 0 76 57 880 5643
8. EA SR07 85 27 80 17 15 29 32 0 83 210 101
9. EA QUEST09 ∞ 63 58 67 54 68 43 61 0 28 35
10. EA CKL09 ∞ 869 482 221 162 3227 25 1115 20 0 35
11. EA GNSS10 ∞ 151 832 1333 326 115 93 115 17 11 0
coeﬃcients (ρ,α,β, ˜ β) and the horizon h to minimize average model loss:
M X
m=1
1
M
  Lm =
M X
m=1
1
M
[V ar(πm) + V ar(ym) + V ar( im)] (4)
where m is a counter enumerating the models and M = 11 the total number of models.
The resulting optimized model averaging rule includes inﬂation and output growth over the
preceding four quarters together with the current output gap and the lagged interest rate:
it = 0.96it−1 + 0.30πt + 0.19yt + 0.31(yt − yt−4) (5)
The coeﬃcient on the lagged interest rate is near unity. The coeﬃcients on inﬂation,
output gap and growth are all positive. Output gap and growth are calculated relative to
the ﬂexible price benchmark.
This model averaging rule delivers fairly robust performance across all eleven models.
To illustrate its robustness we compute the increase in loss in percentage terms that results
from the model averaging rule in each of the 11 models relative to the best model speciﬁc
rule in that model (i.e. the rules from Table 1). It is shown in the ﬁrst row of Table 4.
The increase in losses is much more moderate than in the case of the model speciﬁc rules.
There is no case of indeterminacy or explosiveness. Except for two cases the percentage
17Table 4: Robustness of Model Averaging Rule
Models 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.
Ave. Rule (ALL) 122 15 18 10 7 35 14 62 32 39 46
increase does not exceed 50 percent of the minimum loss. It is 62 percent in the EA SR07
model and 122 percent in the ECB’s old Area Wide model EA AWM05. Thus, robustness
comes at a signiﬁcant cost in terms of performance deterioration relative to a scenario where
the correct model is known. However, the model averaging rule achieves great improvements
under model uncertainty, i.e. relative to a scenario where the policy maker follows a rule
that is optimized for one model but one of the other models turns out be a better match to
the structure of the euro area economy.
The robustness exhibited by the model averaging rule is in a sense, in sample. It per 
forms robustly across the sample of 11 models that is included in the average loss that the
rule minimizes. An open question, however, is how well such a procedure for deriving robust
policies performs out of sample. For example, what if only a subset of models is used in
averaging? How robust is such a rule in models not considered in the average loss?
As discussed earlier, the models are ordered in a certain chronological order, not in terms
publication date but in terms of the ”age” of the theory underlying the models. EA AWM05
stands out as a traditional Keynesian style model with largely backward looking expecta 
tions formation. Some economists might have considered this feature a reason for dropping
the model from consideration. Then, there are the models numbered 2 to 5, that is the
T 93 EU, EA CW05fm, EA CW05ta and G3 CW03 models. These models are best de 
scribed as ﬁrst generation New Keynesian models. They include rational expectations and
nominal rigidities such as staggered contracts. However, they do not fully enforce all the
cross equation restrictions that result from utility maximization of households and proﬁt 
maximization of imperfectly competitive ﬁrms as in more New Keynesian DSGE models.
Given the earlier mentioned criticism of DSGE modeling prior to the crisis, this property
need not necessarily be a drawback. We refer to these four models as the NK1 group.
The models numbered 6 to 9, that is the EA SW0, EACZ GEM03, EA SR07 and
18EA QUEST09 models are monetary business cycle models that are derived consistently
from the optimizing behavior of households and ﬁrms under rational expectations. New
Keynesian features include imperfect competition and staggered nominal contracts. These
four models were built and used at policy institutions for policy analysis prior to the global
ﬁnancial crisis. We term these four models the NK DSGE group.
We then derive model averaging rules for the NK1 and NK DSGE group and evaluate
how robust they are out of sample. The out of sample models include the old ECB’s Area 
Wide model as well as the new DSGE models built and estimated during the ﬁnancial crisis,
that is EA CKL09, which includes search frictions in labor markets, and EA GNSS10, which
includes ﬁnancial frictions, credit and banking.
Model averaging with the NK1 group implies minimizing the loss
P5
m=2(1/4)[Lm], while
model averaging with the NK DSGE group implies minimizing the loss
P9
m=6(1/4)[Lm].
The resulting model averaging rules are given by:
NK1: it = 0.98it−1 + 0.60πt+4 + 0.75yt+4 − 0.43(yt+4 − yt) (6)
NK DSGE: it = 1.05it−1 + 0.28πt + 0.01yt + 0.82(yt − yt−4) (7)
Both rules exhibit near unity values on the lagged interest rate. The NK1 rule responds to
inﬂation, output and output growth forecasts four quarters into the future. The NK DSGE
rule is essentially a ﬁrst diﬀerence rule for interest rates responding to current inﬂation and
output growth relative to four quarters earlier. The current output gap has a near zero
coeﬃcient.
The in sample and out of sample robustness of these two rules is indicated in Table 5 by
the increase in loss in percentage terms in each of the 11 models relative to the respective
model speciﬁc rule.
Table 5: Robustness of NK1 and NK DSGE Averaging Rule
Models 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.
Ave. Rule NK1) 139 3 6 3 2 14 64 163 76 22 59
Ave. Rule NK DSGE) 191 33 40 25 23 30 5 9 23 92 96
19The NK1 and NK DSGE rules also perform fairly robustly across models. There are
no cases of indeterminacy or explosiveness. In some models the performance relative to
the model speciﬁc rule is better than for the rule that averages over all models (ALL), but
in others it is worse. The performance of the three model averaging rules is most easily
compared by the graphic representation in Figure 11. The horizontal axis indicates models
1 to 11. The blue line refers to the increase in loss relative to model speciﬁc rules under
the ALL rule. The red line indicates the robustness of the NK1 rule and the green line the
NK DSGE rule.
Not surprisingly, the NK1 rule performs best for the models of the NK1 group and the
NK DSGE rule for the models of the NK DSGE group. Performance deteriorates out of
sample. Somewhat surprisingly the NK1 rule is better in models 1, 10 and 11, (EA AWM05,
EA CKL09, EA GNSS10), than the NK DSGE rule.
Figure 12 also includes the performance of the GR and DIF0 rules from Table 1 across
models. The GR rule performs worse than the other rules in 7 out of 11 models. The
diﬀerence to the ALL rule is greater than 50% of the minimum loss in 7 of the models. As
noted earlier, the outcome based DIF0 rule implies explosive behavior in model 1, the ECB’s
old Area Wide model (EA AWM05). However, if one removes this model from consideration
this diﬀerence rule is surprisingly robust. The diﬀerence to the minimum loss is close to
or less than 50 percent of the minimum loss in 9 of the models. Importantly, however,
robustness of the diﬀerence rule is weakened substantially once it is based on forecasts.
For example, the version with four quarter ahead forecasts suﬀers from drastic increases in
losses in models 2,6, 9, 10 and 11 of magnitudes much greater than 200 % of the minimum
loss.
9 Output Gap Mismeasurement and Robustness
As discussed in section 3 an important source of model uncertainty is the concept of potential
output, that is the level of output consistent with long run price stability. This variable is
unobservable. It can only be computed using a particular model of potential output. As a
20result, estimates of potential output are frequently revised and revisions are made even many
years after the date to which the estimates apply. The diﬀerence between real time and fall
2011 estimates of the euro area output gap by the European Commission was previously
reviewed in section 3. The persistence of the degree of mismeasurement of the output gap
is due to the revision of potential output estimates and not of actual output. The high
degree of persistence of output gap mismeasurement can be illustrated by modeling it with
a simple autoregressive process and estimating its parameters. We denote the diﬀerence
between the real time gap estimate and the 2011 gap estimate by ǫ. OLS estimates of this
process with the data shown previously in Figure 3 imply:
ǫt = 0.911ǫt−1 + νt where ν ∼ N(0,0.2615) (8)
The estimate of the autoregressive parameter is highly signiﬁcant with a 95% conﬁdence
interval of [0.79,1.03]. The R2 is 0.77. If a constant is included, its estimate is insigniﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero.
To investigate the implications of output mismeasurement for monetary stabilization
policy we add the estimated process for ǫt to the output gap(s) that appear in the interest
rate rule as in Orphanides (2003a) and Orphanides (2003b). The policy maker does not
observe the correct output gap and sets interest rates persistently too high or too low. Then
we evaluate the performance of the diﬀerent policy rules and optimize their coeﬃcients in
the 11 models. Typically, the response coeﬃcient(s) on the output gap(s) decline relative
to the case without output gap mismeasurement while the coeﬃcient on inﬂation increases
(results not shown here).
Market participants in the models we consider are assumed to form rational expectations
knowing the correct output gaps as well as the error process entering the central bank’s
policy rule. Thus, there is asymmetric information between the central bank and market
participants. As pointed out by Beck and Wieland (2008) the potential impact of output
gap misperceptions is much greater in the more realistic case of symmetric misperceptions
regarding the aggregate output gap. In this regard, our approach tends to understate the
possible consequences of noisy output gaps.
21We also re optimize the model averaging rules in the presence of output gap mismea 
surement and re compute the losses under the Taylor, GR and DIF0 rules from Table 2.
Table 6 indicates the coeﬃcients of the model averaging rules with noisy output measure 
ment relative to the earlier values obtained when the output gap is observed without error.
Table 6: Model Averaging Rules with Noisy Output Gaps
Rule ρ α β ˜ β h
ALL (no noise) 0.96 0.30 0.19 0.31 0
ALL (with noise) 0.90 0.43 0.19 0.23 0
NK1 (no noise) 0.98 0.60 0.75  0.43 4
NK1(with noise) 0.96 0.81 0.62  0.28 4
NK DSGE (no noise) 1.05 0.28 0.01 0.82 0
NK DSGE (with noise) 1.17 0.49 0.05 0.79 2
For the ALL rule that was derived by averaging over all 11 models and for the NK1
rule that averaged over four early New Keynesian models the optimal horizon h stays the
same. The ALL rule uses current values and the NK1 rule 4 quarter ahead forecasts. Thus,
for the ALL and NK1 rules the response coeﬃcients with and without noisy output gaps
are directly comparable. Typically the coeﬃcient on inﬂation increases and the coeﬃcients
on the output gap and the output growth rate stay the same or decline in absolute value
with output gap mismeasurement. The coeﬃcient on the lagged interest rate also declines
a bit.In the case of the four New Keynesian DSGE models built before the ﬁnancial crisis
the rule using two quarter ahead forecasts now slightly dominates the rule responding to
current outcomes. For the NK DSGE rules the coeﬃcients are not directly comparable
because of the change in horizon.
Figure 13 displays percent increases in loss under the ALL, NK1, NK DSGE, GR and
DIF0 rules relative to the model speciﬁc rules when the output gap is mis measured. Due to
the additional noise, losses and percent loss increases relative to minimum loss are greater
than in Figure 12. The NK DSGE rule turns out to be less robust and delivers substantially
worse performance in model 11, (EA GNSS10). The DIF0 rule remains fairly close to the
22ALL and NK1 model averaging rules. Its robustness properties, however, deteriorate again
if forecasts are used in place of recent outcomes (not shown).
10 Conclusions
The complexity resulting from intertwined uncertainties regarding potential model mis 
speciﬁcation and mismeasurement of the state of the economy deﬁnes the monetary policy
landscape. Policymakers, including at the ECB, are sensitive to the complexity of the
environment in which policy is set. Using the euro area as laboratory in this paper we ex 
plore the design of robust policy guides aiming to maintain stability in the economy while
recognizing the complexity facing policymakers.
As we show, the main ECB policy rate is characterized rather well by a simple ﬁrst
diﬀerence rule that explains the quarterly change in the policy rate in terms of the near
term forecast of inﬂation deviation from the ECB’s deﬁnition of price stability and the
near term output growth deviation from its trend. An advantage of this simple rule is that
its implementation does not require real time estimates for the output gap that have been
subject to severe mismeasurement before the crisis.
To capture the complex environment facing policymakers we conduct an evaluation of
alternative policy rules across 11 quarterly models of the euro area. We use these models
to examine implications and limits of robustness analysis. To capture as wide a range
of alternative modeling strategies as possible, we consider the development of models of
the euro area from the beginning of the EMU to just prior the ﬁnancial crisis. We also
incorporate models that include more detailed characterization of ﬁnancial intermediation
and banking risks informed by the ﬁrst years of the crisis.
The analysis conﬁrms the fragility of policy analysis optimized for any speciﬁc model
and shows the merits of model averaging in policy design. Rules derived by averaging over
all 11 euro area models are found to perform better when they use current outcomes rather
than forecasts of output and inﬂation. Model averaging rules serve as useful benchmarks
23against which the robustness of other policy prescriptions may be evaluated. Interestingly,
a simple diﬀerence rule with coeﬃcients of 1/2 on inﬂation and output growth deviations,
just like the rule shown to be useful for interpreting ECB interest rate policy, is quite robust
as long as it responds to current outcomes rather than forecasts.
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28Figure 1
Inﬂation and Long-Term Inﬂation Expectations
Notes: HICP shows the rate of increase of the index over 12 months. Expected inﬂation
is the average ﬁve year ahead forecast reported in the ECB SPF. The thin lines denote
the 25% and 75% percentiles and the shaded area reﬂects the interquartile range of the
cross sectional distribution of the individual responses.
29Figure 2
The Evolution of the Output Gap Before the Crisis
Notes: The two series trace the evolution of output gap estimates for the year 2006 and
2007, as reported by the European Commission in the Spring and Autumn forecasts.
30Figure 3
Real-time vs Retrospective Output Gap Estimates
Notes: The Fall 2011 series shows the historical output gap estimates from the latest Euro 
pean Commission forecast (Fall 2011). The real time series shows, in each year, the output
gap estimate of the year from the European Commission Spring and Fall forecasts.
31Figure 4
Outlook for Inﬂation
Notes: Expected inﬂation, one year and two years ahead, represent the average responses
in the ECB SPF.
32Figure 5
Outlook for GDP Growth
Notes: Expected growth one year and two years ahead represent the average responses
in the ECB SPF. Potential output growth reﬂects the real time estimate for the year as
reported in the European Commision’s Spring and Autumn forecasts.
33Figure 6
Policy Rate and Simple Rule Prescription: Quarterly Change
Notes: The shaded area represents the envelope of prescriptions from the simple policy rule:
 i = 1
2(π −π∗)+ 1
2( q −  q∗). (π −π∗) reﬂects the deviations in the SPF one year ahead
inﬂation forecasts from either of two bounds as shown in Figure 4. ( q −  q∗) reﬂects
the deviations in the SPF one year ahead GDP growth forecasts from the potential output
growth shown in Figure 5. The solid line shows the quarterly change in the ECB policy
rate (MRO) following the policy meeting of the 2nd month in each quarter.
34Figure 7
Policy Rate and Simple Rule Prescription
Notes: The shaded area represents the envelope of prescriptions from the simple policy rule:
 i = 1
2(π − π∗) + 1
2( q −  q∗), that emerge from applying the prescribed change to the
level of the policy rate a quarter earlier. (π−π∗) reﬂects the deviations in the SPF one year
ahead inﬂation forecasts from either of two bounds as shown in Figure 4. ( q− q∗) reﬂects
the deviations in the SPF one year ahead GDP growth forecasts from the potential output
growth shown in Figure 5. The solid line shows the ECB policy rate (MRO) following the
policy meeting of the 2nd month in each quarter.
35Figure 8
Money Market and ECB Policy Interest Rates
Notes: Eonia is the 5 day trailing moving average.
36Figure 9
Impulse Responses to a Monetary Policy Shock: 11 Euro Area Models
Notes: Impact of a one percentage point shock to monetary policy.
37Figure 10
Autocorrelation Functions: 11 Euro Area Models
38Figure 11
Robustness of NK1, NK-DSGE and ALL Model-Averaging Rules
39Figure 12
Robustness of GM and DIF0 Relative to Model-Averaging Rules
40Figure 13
Robustness of Rules with Noisy Output Gap Measures
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